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Comity Cuts Both Ways: A Company v The Bank

How the Hong Kong Court of First Instance dealt with a Canadian bank’s argument that enforcing a EUR 30 million arbitral award would expose it to a real risk of criminal prosecution under Canadian sanctions law.

In A Company v The Bank [2026] HKCFI 3169, the Court of First Instance considered whether enforcing an arbitral award would contravene Hong Kong public policy. A Canadian bank (the “Bank“) argued that enforcement would expose it and its employees to a real risk of criminal prosecution under Canadian sanctions law. The Court dismissed the Bank’s application to set aside the enforcement order, holding that the Bank had not established a real risk of prosecution; even if established, enforcement would not have contravened Hong Kong public policy.

  • A party resisting enforcement of a final arbitral award on the ground of a real risk of foreign prosecution faces a high threshold, reflecting the public interest in the finality and speedy enforcement of awards.
  • A letter from a foreign government department is not a judicial finding and does not displace a tribunal’s findings on foreign law, particularly where those findings follow full argument and expert evidence.
  • Hong Kong public policy is Hong Kong’s own. It is not to be dictated by the foreign policy objectives of another state. Hong Kong’s pro-enforcement and arbitration-friendly approach under the New York Convention remains the touchstone.

Background and Canadian Sanctions

  1. A Russian company, said to be the world’s largest producer of high-grade nickel and palladium (the “Company“), entered into a contract with the “H Companies” on 29 December 2021 (the “Contract“). The Contract was for H Companies to provide engineering and technical services, the supply of goods, and works at the Company’s metallurgical plant in Russia.
  1. On 26 and 28 January 2022, the H Companies obtained three bank guarantees from the Bank. The Bank undertook to pay the Company more than EUR 30 million if the H Companies failed to perform their obligations or refund advance payments under the Contract.
  1. On 13 October 2022, the Company terminated the Contract after the H Companies refused to refund advance payments. The following month, the Company demanded payment under the Guarantees. The Bank accepted that the demands complied with the Guarantee terms, but said Canadian sanctions prohibited payment.
  1. Canada had imposed special economic measures in 2014 in response to Russia’s occupation of Crimea. The measures were made under regulations (the “Russia Regulations”) enacted under the Special Economic Measures Act 1992 (“SEMA”). They prohibit Canadians from dealing with property of persons listed in Schedule 1, on pain of criminal liability.
  1. In June 2023, section 2.1 of SEMA extended the prohibition to property merely “deemed” to be owned by a listed person, including property held by an entity that a listed person controls. The Company’s CEO, President and Chair of the Management Board (“X”) beneficially owns approximately 40% of the Company. X together with three other individuals (the “Four Individuals”) are said to hold more than 50% in aggregate beneficial ownership.
  1. Around one month after the Guarantees were issued, Russia invaded Ukraine. Canada added the Four Individuals to Schedule 1 as part of a wider sanctions package. In May 2023, the Company applied to Global Affairs Canada (“GAC”) for confirmation that the Bank did not need a permit to pay under the Guarantees, or alternatively if a permit was required, to apply for the same. There was no evidence that the Company’s application produced any outcome.

The Arbitration and GAC’s Response

  1. In September 2023, the Company commenced arbitration in the London Court of International Arbitration against the Bank for payment under the Guarantees. The Bank’s essential defence was that payment would be unlawful in Canada and would constitute a criminal offence under the Canadian sanctions’ regime.
  1. The Tribunal found that the place of performance of the Guarantees was Moscow, Russia. The Tribunal also found that the Bank had not established that the Russia Regulations applied to the Company under any of the three limbs in section 2.1(2) of SEMA. The illegality defence therefore failed. The Tribunal further held that, even if performance required the Bank to take steps illegal in Canada, that did not provide a contractual defence under English law.
  1. The Tribunal ordered the Bank to pay EUR 30,012,624.18 plus interest (the “Award”). It was acknowledged that this was a case of first instance, with no Canadian case law or departmental guidance on the deemed-ownership provisions. The Tribunal, therefore, observed that the only remaining concern was that Canadian prosecuting authorities might take a different view on the conclusions reached by the Tribunal regarding illegality.
  1. Shortly after the Award, the Bank began engaging with GAC. By a letter of 30 July 2025, the Bank informed GAC of the Award and sought clarification on whether payment to the Company was prohibited and whether a permit could be granted.
  1. The Bank also promptly applied to GAC for a permit to make payment. On 13 August 2025, GAC responded that it had assessed the Company as deemed to be owned by a listed person under section 2.1 of SEMA. The GAC warned the Bank that contravening Canadian sanctions was a criminal offence.
  1. By letter dated 20 March 2026 (the “Letter”), GAC formally refused to grant a permit allowing payment pursuant to the Award. The Letter stated that X had been a listed person since 5 April 2022 and that his position in the Company enabled him to direct the Company’s activities, satisfying the “deemed ownership” definition in section 2.1(2)(c) of SEMA. GAC added that granting a permit would be contrary to the foreign policy objectives for which Canada had imposed sanctions on Russia.

The Enforcement Proceedings

  1. On 31 October 2025, the Company obtained leave to enforce the Award as a judgment in Hong Kong (the “Enforcement Order”). On 5 December 2025, the Bank applied to stay the Enforcement Order pending a GAC permit or alternatively, if the permit was not granted, to stay the Enforcement Order “until such time as the [Bank] is able to pay sums due under the Award without risk of prosecution.” Further and in the alternative, the Bank sought to set aside the Enforcement Order on public policy grounds.
  1. The Court identified one core issue: Would enforcement of the Award contravene Hong Kong public policy because it would expose the Bank and its employees to a real risk of criminal prosecution under Canadian law?
  1. In deciding a public policy challenge, the Court’s role is confined to applying the relevant public policy to the findings of fact and law already made in the Award, to see if there is any conflict between the Award and that policy. It is not for the enforcement court to reopen, under the guise of public policy, issues as to the contract’s meaning or its compliance with a regulatory scheme that the Tribunal has already decided.
  1. The Bank relied on the Tribunal’s observation that Canadian authorities might take a different view. The Letter confirmed that this had indeed occurred, since the view on illegality in the Letter was different from that of the Tribunal’s Award. The Bank argued that neither the Tribunal’s findings nor a Hong Kong court order would provide a defence under Canadian criminal law. Only a GAC permit, or the lifting of sanctions, would remove the risk.
  1. The Bank also invoked international comity. It submitted that the Court should respect the Canadian Government’s view of its own sanctions legislation. The Bank emphasised that it was not seeking to relitigate the Tribunal’s decision: the Tribunal had addressed discharge of the Contract for illegality under English law, whereas the enforcement Court had to consider public policy.
  1. The Bank argued that it would otherwise face an impossible choice between breaching the Enforcement Order and risking penal consequences in Canada. The Bank offered instead to pay the Award as soon as it was lawfully able to do so.
  1. The Company responded that the Tribunal had already determined there was no risk of prosecution in Canada. The Tribunal found no illegality in payment to the Company and no contravention of the relevant SEMA provision.
  1. The Company also relied on O v C [2026] 4 WLR 5, submitting that the Bank could not rely on the “real risk of prosecution” defence to resist enforcement of a final award. Indeed, the Tribunal had itself reached the same conclusion in the Award. The defence in O v C, and the related decision in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2019] EWCA Civ 449, concerned interlocutory orders. Enforcement of a final award raises a materially different and more stringent threshold, reflecting the compelling public interest in speedy enforcement. The Court accepted the Company’s submission on the higher threshold for enforcement of final awards.

The Court’s Reasoning

  1. The Court held that the Bank had not established a real risk of prosecution.
  1. The Court applied a two-step test: first, whether a real (as opposed to a fanciful) risk of prosecution has been established, bearing in mind that the burden lies on the party resisting enforcement; and second, if such a risk is established, whether a balancing exercise favours refusing enforcement, weighing the risk of prosecution against the importance of the relief sought.
  1. First, even in an interlocutory context, a risk of prosecution under foreign law does not automatically justify non-compliance. The forum has a legitimate interest in the conduct of its own proceedings: Bank Mellat. That applies with greater force at the final-award enforcement stage.
  1. Second, the Tribunal had heard expert evidence and found no underlying illegality. The Letter was issued after the Award, and it was a statement of Canada’s current ministerial policy, not a finding of a Canadian court.
  1. Third, the Tribunal had found that the Bank’s payment obligation was to be performed in Russia.
  1. Fourth, there was doubt whether enforcement would necessarily expose the Bank or its staff to a real risk of prosecution. Enforcement by garnishee proceedings, without the Bank’s active assistance, may not amount to voluntary compliance. The Bank had not shown that there were no alternative arrangements in making payments pursuant to the Award.
  1. Finally, the Bank’s prompt and good-faith efforts to comply with Canadian law were relevant, as was the absence of active assistance in enforcement. These were matters the Canadian authorities would likely take into account as a mitigating factor. As the Court held in O v C, comity may also influence the foreign state’s own decision whether to prosecute for compliance with a court order. Comity cuts both ways.

Hong Kong Public Policy

  1. The Court held that, even if there was a real risk of prosecution, it would not have set aside the Enforcement Order on public policy grounds.
  1. It has long been Hong Kong public policy to recognise and enforce arbitral awards and to remain an arbitration-friendly, pro-enforcement venue. The relevant public policy is that of Hong Kong, not Canada, which is not to be dictated by the foreign policy objectives of another state.
  1. This mirrored the Court’s own earlier decision in Bank A v Bank B [2024] 5 HKLRD 250, which held that it was not against Hong Kong public policy to issue an anti-suit injunction restraining Russian proceedings simply because an EU sanction was in focus, since that sanction did not affect the rights of any Hong Kong entity. The Canadian sanctions in this case likewise had no application to Hong Kong and no role to play in Hong Kong public policy.
  1. The Bank bore the commercial risk of potentially conflicting legal obligations when it chose to issue the Guarantees. The public policy ground is narrowly construed. It applies only where enforcement would “shock the conscience” of the court or violate its most basic notions of morality and justice: A v R [2009] 3 HKLRD 389. Neither was shown by the Bank here.
  1. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the Company was at fault for choosing to enforce in Hong Kong despite the Contract, the Guarantees and the Arbitration having no connection to the jurisdiction. A party may enforce an arbitral award in any jurisdiction where the debtor has assets, that ease of enforcement under the New York Convention is the whole point of choosing arbitration.
  1. The Setting Aside Summons was therefore dismissed. The Company obtained its costs on an indemnity basis.
  1. The Bank’s application for a stay of the Enforcement Order was also refused. The first basis no longer applied once the GAC, on behalf of Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, had already refused a permit, and the Court declined the alternative, indefinite stay sought “until such time as the Bank is able to pay the sums due under the Award without risk of prosecution” as contrary to the aims of the Arbitration Ordinance and the Company’s entitlement to the fruits of a valid and binding award.
Date:
15 October 2026
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